By Willard C. Matthias
This survey of greater than fifty years of nationwide safeguard coverage juxtaposes declassified U.S. nationwide intelligence estimates with lately published Soviet records disclosing the perspectives of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies at the related occasions. Matthias exhibits that U.S. intelligence estimates have been often right yet that our political and armed forces leaders quite often neglected them—with occasionally disastrous effects. The e-book starts off with a glance again on the function of U.S. intelligence in the course of global battle II, from Pearl Harbor throughout the plot opposed to Hitler and the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional hand over" of Japan, and divulges how larger use of the intelligence to be had may have stored many lives and shortened the warfare. the subsequent chapters facing the chilly battle divulge what info and recommendation U.S. intelligence analysts handed directly to policymakers, and likewise what occasionally sour coverage debates happened in the Communist camp, referring to Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile trouble, the turmoil in jap Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars within the center East, and the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. in lots of methods, this can be a tale of ignored possibilities the U.S. executive needed to behavior a extra liable international coverage which can have shunned huge losses of existence and large charges on palms buildups. whereas now not exonerating the CIA for its personal errors, Matthias casts new mild at the contributions that target intelligence research did make in the course of the chilly conflict and speculates on what may have occurred if that evaluation and recommendation were heeded.
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Additional info for America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991
28 A m e r i c a ’s S t r a t e g i c B l u n d e r s recognized therefore that Hitler’s generals would bend every effort to satisfy Hitler of their loyalty regardless of the military recklessness of his orders. Instead of confronting the intelligence data and discussing the possibilities implicit in the analysis—even though it did not have an ultra stamp on it— they relied upon their own professional assumptions, and those assumptions were wrong. An intelligence failure did occur when the intelligence officers on the line failed to impress upon their superiors what was happening across the German border.
35. , 470. ”36 Montgomery’s defeat in Holland was the result of several factors: Montgomery’s failure to understand the depth of the earlier German defeat, his failure to keep track of major German military units, his choice of a highly dubious strategy over a more promising one urged by Patton, and his insubordinate refusal to accept guidance from Eisenhower and his staff. The Nijmegen fiasco, though not much publicized or really understood by the British and American chiefs of staff, led to a loss of momentum and of confidence and to a mental block against the exploration of other ways to bring an early conclusion to the war.
F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 3. I n t e l l i g e n c e Tr i u m p h s a n d F a i l u r e s i n W o r l d W a r I I 25 uses of ultra in the European theater is contained in Ronald Lewin’s Ultra Goes to War, published in 1978. His book tells the ultra story in the European theater in great detail from the inception of the communications intelligence effort to the final German defeat in 1945. Exactly how much the victory over the Germans was in fact dependent upon ultra is still being debated.